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Chapter Five 
George W. Bush, the American Press, 
and the Initial Framing of the 
War on Terror after 9/11 
Jim A. Kuypers, Stephen D. Cooper, and 
Matthew T. Althouse 
President George W. Bush's speech to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on November I 0, 200 I, marks an important moment in the history of 
the War on Terror. 1 It followed closely upon the joint U.S.-Northern Alliance 
military capture of Mazari Sarif, Afghanistan, which significantly disrupted 
the Taliban's operations and arguably marked the official beginning of 
America's War on Terror. As President Bush stated, "The time for sympathy 
has now passed; the time for action has now arrived."2 In some ways, the 
speech offered nothing new. It reiterated words and ideas that the president 
frequently used to label elements of the situation following the 9/11 attacks. 
Certainly the speech was important in that it offered the American public and 
the world a refinement of the meaning of the war and of the actions the White 
House would next take. This speech marks another important moment in the 
War on Terror, however, the moment when the American press moved from 
a neutral reportorial posture to a posture hostile to the Bush administration. 
We are aware that the assertion above is somewhat controversial since it 
contradicts numerous studies that argue the news media inadequately cri-
tiqued the president's framing of the War on Terror following 9/11. Exam-
ples of such findings, academic and journalistic, are plentiful. 3 For example, 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman suggested the news media simply 
echoed the Bush Administration. Further, they argued that, prior to 9/11, the 
news media framed President Bush as "unqualified," inexperienced," and 
"not too bright." Following 9/11, media switched to framing him as a "strong 
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leader" and as a "unifier."4 In a separate work, Waldman asserted that Presi-
dent Bush "lies" and that the mainstream media was unquestioning in its 
treatment of Bush following 9/11, essentially failing to criticize his policies 
at a1J.5 And, Stephen D. Reese and Seth C. Lewis bluntly asserted that the 
media "abrogate[d] their responsibility to critically examine policy assump-
tions embedded jn frames" 6 in their coverage of the administration's policy 
statements. 
Using a rhetorical version of framing analysis, 7 however, we discovered 
quite a different story, one that strongly suggests that far from supporting the 
president, that eight weeks after 9/11 , the mainstream American news moved 
beyond reporting about political opposition to the president's initiatives and 
instead began to generate its own opposition. Moreover, we discovered that, 
by the end of formal military operations in Afghanistan, the mainstream 
American news media was framing its reports in such a way that President 
Bush's public statements were inaccurately transmitted to the America pub-
lic. We believe that one possible explanation for our disagreement with what 
seems to have become conventional wisdom on this matter is that we do not 
consider the press's use of terms, short phrases, or labels found in adminis-
tration statements to constitute endorsement or even uncritical echoing of the 
administration's viewpoint. Quite simply, journalists routinely use parsimo-
nious labels to refer to a common theme in their continuing coverage, and 
these labels may well be those used by advocates for a policy position. 
Nonetheless, it is not the case that the press's use of the label constitutes 
approval or disapproval of the policy, in and of itself. Thus, if a news source 
simply adopts a term used by the Bush administration for its counter-terror-
ism policy, it may be hasty for a scholar to point to this as evidence of 
uncritical reporting. 8 Given that so much of the scholarly framing literature 
does just this-simply counts instances of terms and then imputes press 
support or opposition-we instead offer a different approach, one that looks 
for the way in which the terms are infused with meaning. We discuss this in 
more detail in the conclusion of our chapter. 
Taking the above into account in our analysis, we chose to identify major 
themes in both the president's statements and press reports, and then to 
contrast the respective framing of those themes in administration statements 
and in press reports. Our chapter proceeds in four sections: first, we provide a 
brief overview of how frames work; second, we discuss the relationship of 
frames to the news media; third, we compare the frames of President Bush 
and the news media; fourth, we present a discussion of our findings. 
We wish to stress at the outset several points about our study. First, it is 
not a defense or critique of any policy position or political actor. Rather, this 
study critically compares news reporting about a major presidential address 
to the actual text of the speech itself. Second, although the findings have 
theoretical implications, this is not a theory-building eff011. It is instead a 
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case study through which we gain insights into the fidelity of media coverage 
concerning some of Bush's justifications for the War on Terror. Third, this 
study emphasizes the value of fidelity between an event and reporting about 
an event. As stated in the ethics code of the Society of Professional Journal-
ists, accuracy is a cardinal tenet of the profession. 9 News accuracy can be 
studied from a variety of perspectives, including opposition to or for an 
ideology, for instance. 10 Unimpeachable fidelity may be a practical and theo-
retical impossibility; nonetheless, we maintain that it is a socially desirable 
ideal, just as it is an ethical aspiration for working journalists. Put in more 
direct terms, the greater the degree of fidelity of the reportage to the events, 
the higher the benefit to the public. Thus, the design of this study compares a 
presidential address to media coverage of it, with the intent of highlighting 
interpretive commentaries introduced in the news reporting process. Finally, 
this study acts to demonstrate the benefits of a rhetorical version of framing 
analysis by comparing our results to results generated using social scientific 
versions of framing analysis. To this last point we now turn. 
FRAMES AND RHETORICAL FRAMING ANALYSIS 
The rhetorical power of a frame comes from its functions to make sense of 
relevant events and to suggest what is at issue. 11 Jim A. Kuypers stressed that 
facts "take on their meaning by being embedded in a fi·ame or story line that 
organizes them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to empha-
size while ignoring others." 12 Framing, then, is the process whereby commu-
nicators act--consciously or not-to construct a particular point of view that 
encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed in a particular manner, 
with some facts made more noticeable than others. •3 
The influence of frames is demonstrated in numerous studies. For in-
stance, in an examination of reporting concerning mandatory HIV testing, 
Paul Sniderman, Richard Brody, and Philip Tetlock 14 found that a majority 
of an audience supported rights of persons with AIDS when this question 
was framed as a matter of civil liberties. However, they supp011ed mandatory 
testing when framed as a matter of public health. In another study about 
reactions to a Ku Klux Klan march, Thomas Nelson, Rosalee Clawson, and 
Zoe Oxley reported similar effects of news repot1ing. Participants watched 
two different videotapes, one framing the matter as a free speech issue, the 
other as a disruption of public order. Viewers exposed to video framing the 
Klan march as a "free speech story expressed more tolerance for the Klan" 
than viewers of the story framing the event as an issue of public order.• 5 
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When highlighting some aspect of reality over others, frames act to define 
problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies to 
problems. Located in the communicator, text, receiver, and culture at large, 
frames provide the interpretive cues for otherwise neutral facts. They are 
composed of, yet not necessarily reducible to, key words, metaphors, con-
cepts, images, and symbols; these elements will consistently appear within a 
narrative and "convey thematically consonant meanings across ... time." 16 
Framing is, however, a normal part of the communication process; we need 
ways to negotiate the massive amounts of information that comes to us every 
day. Large and complex ideas and events demand framing since they have so 
many elements demanding our attention. Because of this, framing analysis is 
a particularly useful way to understand the potential impact of rhetoric. 
Framing and the News Media 
Certainly framing analysis can be used to examine a wide array of communi-
cation mtifacts, yet we feel that it is particularly suited to examine the main-
stream news media. We follow here what Paul D'Angelo identifies as one of 
the conjectures of "hard core" framing research: "that frames are elements of 
news stories that amalgamate textual items (words and images) with the 
contextual treatment that they receive from framing devices. Frames are 
therefore considered to be onto logically distinct from the topic of news sto-
ries." 17 In short, the "facts" of news story can be distinct from their frame; 
the same "facts" can be framed in different ways. Obviously, reporters can-
not cover every matter that comes to their attention, and not every important 
article can be placed on the front page of a paper. As Jian-Hua Zhu notes, as 
one issue rises to prominence in news coverage, others invariably drift to-
ward obscurity .18 For instance, agenda-setting literature demonstrates how 
news reporting focuses public attention on particular matters and away from 
others. 19 Some variables at work in this focusing may include the length of a 
news story, its placement in a newspaper or during a broadcast, or its ex-
tended coverage over time; yet, while topics are placed in view of the pub-
lic's eye, they command attention. What is more, these variables affect what 
audiences consider to be significant. Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder 
note that those in their study "who were shown network broadcasts edited to 
draw attention to a particular problem assigned greater impottance to that 
problem-greater impottance than they themselves did before the experi-
ment began, and greater importance than did people assigned to control 
conditions that emphasized different problems."20 
While the concept of agenda-setting explains how the news can focus 
public attention on certain issues, studies moving beyond agenda-setting ex-
amine how the news influences how the public makes sense of issues. Two 
such study areas involve "second-level effects of agenda setting" and "agen-
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da extension." The first deals with how particular attributes in a story are 
stressed, subsequently influencing the way the public views those particular 
attributes. 21 Conclusions flowing from second-level agenda-setting studies 
suggest that the news media can focus pubic attention on particular attributes 
within an issue or an event. Examining news reports from a second-level 
perspective allows us to explore how the media can elevate one attribute of 
an issue/event over another in the mind of the news-consuming public. Such 
stressing of attributes can carry over into public evaluations ofthose covered 
in the story. For example, ifthere is a local school crisis, and the press covers 
it, school officials would be judged by how well they manage the crisis. 
However, the news-consuming public's assessment of how well the crisis 
was managed would be made in relation to the content of media coverage. 
Thus, if media coverage ofthe crisis stressed attribute "Q" over attribute "J," 
the public would more likely use attribute "Q" when making judgments 
about how well the school officials responded to the crisis. 
The second area of consideration, agenda-extension, 22 deals with how 
media provides an interpretive lens through which to view the issue or event. 
That is, how the news media constructs its stories invites or induces its 
audience to understand the issue or event from one specific point of view. 
Further, the notion of agenda-extension suggests that the way a news story is 
shaped invites or induces readers and viewers to understand the story from a 
particular perspective. An agenda-extension orientation recognizes that the 
media can elevate an issue or attribute's saliency. However, an agenda-exten-
sion orientation asks not only how the issues or attributes are made salient, 
but also how they simultaneously induce the audience to think about them in 
a particular manner. It is at this point that the notion of agenda-extension 
moves beyond second-level agenda-setting in that it posits that the news 
media not only focus attention on particular attributes of an issue, making 
some portions more salient than others, it does so in such a manner that a 
particular point of view is advanced. More to the point, second-level agenda-
setting examines what attributes are stressed, an agenda-extension perspec-
tive encourages us to see how those attributes are stressed to influence audi-
ence reaction. 23 
Framing Analysis 
There are many ways that researchers can look for how various parts of a 
news story are stressed. One of these is to look for framing, a process through 
which alternative interpretations of issues, events, and political actors may be 
effectively muted. Moreover, the press does not merely supply facts about 
issues and events to the audience, from which the audience then independent-
ly constructs stories; the press supplies facts within a story line, combining 
both factual content and suggested interpretations of the factual content. It is 
94 Chapter5 
here that the theoretical connection of framing and agenda-extension be-
comes apparent: news products provide the audience with a combination of 
cues as to the relative salience of various facts, and already-constructed 
interpretations of those facts. 
Noteworthy examples of agenda-extension in progress can be seen in 
work by Anne Johnston, 24 who demonstrated that news stories not only 
provide their audiences with the important topics to think about, they also 
provide "contextual cues or frames in which to evaluate those subjects."25 In 
their study of the Watergate hearings, Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang 
found that agenda-setting begins when media gatekeepers-station manag-
ers, producers, or editors--decide to publish a particular story, and then 
decide how much attention to give the story. Agenda-extension began when 
they decided how to tell a particular story. 26 As pointed out by Doris Graber, 
it is at this "point where ordinary agenda-setting activities can most readily 
turn into deliberate [agenda-extension]."27 In short, whereas research in 
agenda-setting seeks to identify what attributes are stressed, research from an 
agenda-extension orientation seeks to discover how particular attributes are 
stressed. 28 
Comparative Framing Analysis 
We feel that a fruitful way to look for how frames can shift the meaning of 
events is through comparative framing analysis. In brief, this involves com-
paring two items that could be framed similarly and then looking for differ-
ences in frames or comparing the coverage by different news outlets on the 
same issues. For example, Robert M. Entman comparatively analyzed the 
narratives within news stories about the KAL 007 and Iran Air 655 shoot-
downs. 29 Because the two events could have been reported on in a similar 
fashion, he speculated that any differences in frames would be readily appar-
ent. Entman found that during the two-week period following each shoot-
down, the destruction of KAL 007 was framed as a moral outrage, whereas 
the destruction Iran Air 655 was framed as a technical problem. About this 
matter, he noted that, while frames impose a specific interpretation onto 
events, they also obscure contrary information that may be presented in a 
particular case: "for those stories in which a single frame thoroughly per-
vades the text, stray contrary opinions ... are likely to possess such low 
salience as to be of little practical use." 30 Thus, although it was acceptable 
for political elites to describe the KAL shootdown as a brutal attack, it was 
less likely for them to describe it as a tragedy. The frames had been set. The 
Soviets were evil and at fault for KAL 007. However, to call the Iran Air 655 
shootdown something other than an accident or tragedy would run counter to 
George W. Bush, the American Press, and the Initial Framing of the War 95 
the established frame. Once in place, frames encourage journalists to "per-
ceive, process, and report all further information about the event in ways 
supporting the basic interpretation encoded" in that frame. 31 
Comparing international news coverage ofthe same event, Zizi Apacha-
rissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira examined the frames used by several 
newspapers based in the United States and the United Kingdom concerning 
their reporting of terrorism. The authors found that the "U.S. papers engaged 
in more episodic coverage and the U.K. papers in more thematic coverage of 
terrorism and terrorism-related events." Because they were able to compare 
the national level frames of the different side-by side, the authors were able 
to conclude that, relative to each other, the U.S. papers presented "news 
associated with the military approach, whereas the U.K. papers were oriented 
toward diplomatic evaluations of terrorist events."32 In a similar vein, Jim A. 
Kuypers and Stephen D. Cooper compared news reports made by embedded 
and behind-the-lines reporters during the second Gulf War. 33 They argued 
that "when journalists frame, they construct a particular point of view that 
encourage the facts of a given situation to be interpreted in a specific way. 
Thus journalists can, knowingly or unknowingly, guide the interpretation of 
readers toward a particular point ofview."34 The authors matched stories run 
by embedded reporters and behind-the-lines reporters by date of publication 
and discovered that the reporting varied greatly between the two groups of 
reporters. Journalists embedded with combat troops "often described the war 
in terms of the weakness of Iraqi army resistance; the frequency with which 
regular Iraqi forces deserted or surrendered; and the joy of Iraqi civilians at 
the demise of the Hussein regime." 35 In contradistinction, stories filed by 
"behind-the-lines journalists described the war in terms of the potential of 
Iraqi forces to mount significant unconventional counterattacks; the ferocity 
ofthe Iraqi irregular forces; the inadequacy of Allied war planning; and the 
vulnerability of the Allies' long supply Iines."36 
With such examples of comparative framing analysis in mind, we turn our 
attention to President Bush's speech and its subsequent news media cover-
age. We proceed in three steps. First,-we look for themes and the framing of 
those themes in the president's speech. For the purposes of this study, the 
theme is the subject of discussion, or that which is the subject of the thought 
expressed. The frame, as will be described later, consists of the elements of 
the expression which suggest, or predispose, an interpretation of the meaning 
of the theme. We did not begin with pre-existing themes or frames. As in 
much qualitative work, we sought to have data emerge inductively. Thus, we 
studied the president' s speech as a "snapshot" (i.e., a single, complete text), 
with the intentions of identifying major themes and of identifying Bush's 
own frames for those themes. Second, we examined themes and the framing 
of those themes found in the press coverage of the speech. Our readings of 
news reports were longitudinal to find how coverage developed during two 
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weeks after the speech was delivered. Within any single news story or broad-
cast there is at least one theme, the subject of the report. When looking at 
news repm1s over a period of time, numerous themes may arise, each being 
framed in a particular manner. As David Levin wrote, "The reason themes 
[are] taken as a measure of the presence of frames [is] the difficulty of 
finding a completely developed frame in a single press release. [Frames] are 
built across a series of news media articles, and not all elements are present 
in any single article." 37 Finally, we conclude this article with a comparison of 
the themes and frames of the speech to the themes and frames of the news 
coverage. 
To find news texts for analysis, we considered major mainstream news 
media outlets. The networks included are ABC, CBS, and NBC. The news-
papers included are the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA 
Today. 38 Since the mainstream news media provide framing of events in both 
straight news and op/ed content, and it is plausible to expect both to have 
influence on public understanding of controversial issues, both genres were 
included in this analysis, although considered separately. 39 
THE PRESIDENT SPEAKS TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
As defined by the president in his speech, the War on Terror would be an 
international effm1 spanning the globe. Infused into this idea of international 
cooperation was the theme of civilization versus barbarism-America would 
work with the civilized portions of the world to eradicate terrorists and the 
barbarism they exemplify. According to President Bush, this idea is linked 
with the theme of good versus evil: "The United Nations was founded in this 
cause. In a second world war, we learned there is no isolation from evil. We 
affirmed that some crimes are so terrible they offend humanity, itself. And 
we resolved that the aggressions and ambitions of the wicked must be op-
posed early, decisively, and collectively, before they threaten us all. That evil 
has returned, and that cause is renewed." 
Beyond the United States, civilization itself was enjoined to fight this 
war: "We're asking for a comprehensive commitment to this fight. We must 
unite in opposing all terrorists, not just some of them. In this world there are 
good causes and bad causes, and we may disagree on where the line is drawn. 
Yet, there is no such thing as a good terrorist. No national as pi ration, no 
remembered wrong can ever justify the deliberate murder of the innocent. 
Any government that rejects this principle, trying to pick and choose its 
terrorist friends, will know the consequences." 
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The president also expanded the meaning of the War on Terror: "Every 
civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most basic commitment of 
civilization: We will defend ourselves and our future against terror and law-
less violence." In addition, the "civilized world" was already responding, 
working to deliver its "children from a future of fear." By acting against 
terrorism, nations were actively choosing "the dignity of life over a culture of 
death." Moreover, civilized nations "choose lawful change and civil dis-
agreement over coercion, subversion, and chaos. These commitments-hope 
and order, law and life-unite people across cultures and continents. Upon 
these commitments depend all peace and progress. For these commitments, 
we are determined to fight." 
The nature of the new enemy was a challenging theme for the president to 
convey. Bush had to strengthen America's conception of her terrorist enemy, 
but he also had to present a more official version, one that would allow the 
world to know how America conceived this enemy. The enemies were "hate-
ful groups that exploit poverty and despair .... (They] hate not our policies, 
but our existence; the tolerance of openness and creative culture that defines 
us." 
Although Americans knew of the existence of terrorists and their meth-
ods, and had experienced foreign sponsored terrorism with the 1993 explo-
sion at the World Trade Center, they had never truly experienced it so inti-
mately as with 9/11. Although the Oklahoma City bombing had an effect, it 
involved Americans acting against their own government; moreover, the 
response to that attack was framed not as a war, but as a police action. 9/ll, 
in dramatic form, took the terrorists from the shadows and thrust them into 
the light. President Bush defined the nature of this enemy: "The terrorists call 
their cause holy, yet, they fund it with drug dealing; they encourage murder 
and suicide in the name of a great faith that forbids both. They dare to ask 
God's blessing as they set out to kill innocent men, women and children. But 
the God of Isaac and Ishmael would never answer such a prayer. And a 
murderer is not a martyr; he is just a murderer." At eight weeks, America was 
only beginning to understand the nature of its new enemy and the nature of 
the new war. To both of these concerns President Bush stated: "And the 
people of my country will remember those who have plotted against us. We 
are learning their names. We are coming to know their faces. There is no 
corner of the Earth distant or dark enough to protect them. However long it 
takes, their hour of justice will come." Importantly, Bush spoke beyond the 
needs of Americans, and invited the civilized world to join with him in his 
characterizations of the terrorists: "Every nation has a stake in this cause. As 
we meet, the terrorists are planning more murder-perhaps in my country, or 
perhaps in yours. They kill because they aspire to dominate." 
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The danger posed by the terrorists was repeatedly stressed: "They seek to 
overthrow governments and destabilize entire regions. Every other country is 
a potential target. And all the world faces the most horrifying prospect of all: 
These same terrorists are searching for weapons of mass destruction, the 
tools to turn their hatred into holocaust. They can be expected to use chemi-
cal, biological and nuclear weapons the moment they are capable of doing so. 
No hint of conscience would prevent it." These are serious charges, and 
responding to such demands a new approach. Here we see Bush's first hint of 
a policy of pre-emption: "For every regime that sponsors terror, there is a 
price to be paid. And it will be paid. The allies of terror are equally guilty of 
murder and equally accountable to justice. The Tali ban are now learning this 
lesson-that regime and the terrorists who support it are now virtually indis-
tinguishable." 
By way of summary, the president framed five distinct themes in his 
speech: world wide the struggle of (I) civilization versus barbarism; (2) good 
versus evil; (3) the nature of the enemy as evil, implacable, and murderous; 
(4) the nature of the war as both domestic and global, and enduring; and (5) 
the war as being dissimilar to prior wars. 
PRESS REPORTING OF THE SPEECH 
Although the news media relayed some elements of the president's efforts, it 
also contested or ignored the framing of certain of his themes, and introduced 
new themes. The majority of press rep011s touched upon four major themes. 
The themes are the nature of the War on Terror, World War II or Vietnam, 
the issue of patience, and the nature ofthe enemy. 
Nature of the War on Terror 
CBS Morning News described a "nation swept by both patriotism and fear." 40 
The Washington Post stressed that "the war on terrorism touches all of our 
lives in one way or another, whether it be something simple like the incon-
venience of dealing with increased security checks at work or the fear of the 
unknown facing armed forces personnel in Afghanistan." 41 Echoing the ad-
ministration, the Washington Post editorially stated that, "even after the Tali-
ban is gone, the war against terrorism will continue. The challenge is for 
people to continue ordinary life in the face of this threat. But how will the 
world cope with a terrorism problem that may get worse rather than better for 
the next few years? Pa11 of the answer ... will lie in aggressive military 
actions that make the terrorists pay a severe price for their assaults. And they 
should be coupled with new diplomatic and economic initiatives that offer a 
better life for ordinary people in the Muslim world."42 
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Expanding upon the global reach of the war, This Week relayed that 
President Bush was "talking tough to the world community ... [with] a very 
solemn, very direct speech ... in which he ratcheted up the pressure on world 
leaders to crack down on terrorists .... " 43 Others shared Bush's assertion 
concerning the unique nature of this War on Terror . . For instance, CBS Sun-
day Morning News stated that "the front lines seem to ... coil around the 
world."44 The president's claim that the war would be unconventional and 
lengthy was editorially acknowledged by the Washington Post which wrote 
that, the White House "has said all along that the war on terrorism must be 
conducted on a number of fronts simultaneously. [Defeating] terrorism will 
require a ... bold and creative commitment to long-term political change [in 
the Middle East)."45 The New York Times reported Americans feeling that 
the Administration "had effectively prepared them for a lengthy and uncon-
ventional conflict and had stirred enough patriotic fervor to build substantial 
support for its efforts."46 In a different editorial, the Washington Post stated 
that the "real lesson is that the United States has embarked on a long, com-
plex struggle against terrorists operating under the banner of Islamic funda-
mentalism who are determined to do this country grave harm."47 
The Nature of the War: World War II and Vietnam 
Humans often use analogy for understanding new and complex phenomena, 
and the War on Terror proves no different. The news media we analyze 
asked, was the War on Terror more similar to World War II or Vietnam? In 
so doing, though, understanding of the War on Terror was being guided in a 
specific direction. For example, Cokie Roberts on This Week announced 
recent Gallup poll results: "The current war on terrorism: 89 percent say they 
have a clear idea of what this war is about. That compares with only 49 
percent in Vietnam."48 Following this she asked, is the War on Terror "Viet-
nam or is it WW£1?"49 Conservative writer George Will was her guest, and 
he offered a broad and historical American understanding of those wars. 
Roberts continued: "Let's [come] back to more modern times because 
George raised this question of the goals becoming unclear in Vietnam. Are 
the goals clear here? Do you think that people know what we're after in this 
war, and does that make a difference?" so 
The White House had recently reached out to Hollywood executives in an 
effort to explore possibilities for entertainment media to become involved 
with characterizing the War on Terror. The press noted these overtures, and 
reported that the purpose was to find out "how the entertainment industry can 
contribute to the war effort, replicating in spirit if not in scope the pa11nership 
formed between filmmakers and war planners in the 1940s." 51 With its 
understanding of World War II, the press actively considered American citi-
zens' contributions on the home front. The New York Times noted that, 
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during the 1940s, "food rationing, tin foil drives, victory gardens" served the 
nation. However, "Now debate has been rising over exactly how much sacri-
fice is really needed and how those at home should respond to what Mr. Bush 
calls 'a different kind of conflict."'52 The Times also stated that it was "less 
clear how people can respond at home to the conflict that may be more akin 
to the cold war [than to World War JI]." 53 During World War II the defining 
term was sacrifice. However, sacrifice then involved the rationing of gas, 
food, and appliances. Today's war needed a new sacrifice, and that was to 
come through volunteerism. The New York Times relayed Bush's conception 
here: "Americans willing to volunteer now were ... making a sacrifice. 
'They are taking time away from their family and their profession. "'54 On the 
other hand, Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen wrote in opposition 
to the World War II analogy: the "impetus to make the present situation the 
rough equivalent of World War II has already led the Bush administration to 
embark on a clutch of programs lacking only the Andrews Sisters for chirpy 
accompaniment."55 
For Cohen, Vietnam would be the analogy of choice: the "declaration of 
war against all terrorism anywhere is becoming a liability.lt's a laudable aim 
but one that's clearly beyond us. It may well involve us in a quagmire not 
unlike the one in Vietnam and obfuscate our war aims-once again, as hap-
pened in Vietnam." 56 Published before Cohen's remarks, the New York 
Times editorially stated that "we assure ourselves that this conflict is ... 
different from the one we carried out [in Vietnam]. Yet Vietnam's ghosts are 
still here [and] they steal away the old certainty that the end will inevitably 
be triumphant." Implying that President Bush might lie about the war, the 
paper made a lengthy analogy with President Johnson's handling of the Viet-
nam War. This included a "reminder of what can happen when a president 
lies to the people for what he believes is their own good." The paper contin-
ued, "Johnson wanted to teach the Vietcong a lesson, but in the end it was the 
American people who were forced, to their sorrow, to learn a new way of 
looking at the world. We can't shake those memories." 57 
Patience 
Although Bush only implied the theme of patience in his speech, it was a 
theme generally touched upon throughout his administration's responses to 
9/11. Following Bush's speech, reporters did mention this theme. However, 
they defined patience as a shrinking quality: "but in a sign of potential 
trouble for the administration, many of those interviewed made it clear that 
their patience was not endless, and that they had become somewhat more 
questioning of the government line in recent weeks."58 Patience was also 
linked directly to body counts: "'I think it's easy to be patient ... when there 
aren't casualties of war."' The government's need for secrecy was one other 
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aspect of a dwindling supply of American patience: "Americans would toler-
ate a degree of secrecy about the war if they sensed it was being waged 
competently. 'But the government has not effectively gotten across that they 
are competently handling it on every front.'" 59 
At the time of his speech, 9/11 was a livid, aching memory at eight weeks 
old, and the campaign in Afghanistan was seeing marked military success; on 
the ground, for instance, the stronghold ofMazari Sharif in northern Afghan-
istan had just been captured. True, Bush had implied patience in his speech, 
yet the press raised this theme's prominence through its reporting. For exam-
ple, during the introduction to This Week, co-host Cokie Roberts asked: 
"Bush wants patience, but are the American People willing to wait?" The 
shared interviews reinforced the framing ofthe other reports: It was a shrink-
ing supply. Roberts followed up with this question: "But how long will that 
last with no signs of a swift victory?"60 
The news media reports stressed that no swift victory was to be had in 
either the War on Terror or the war in Afghanistan. Coupled to this was a 
framing of the patience theme stressing a dwindling supply of American 
patience. The New York Times, for instance, editorially wrote, "much hard 
fighting remains before the Taliban can be ousted from power nationwide."61 
A New York Times news story line read: "Patience, for Now, With Flow of 
Information." The Times did repmi that the American public believed the 
White House "had effectively prepared them for a lengthy and unconvention-
al conflict. .. . " The Times also highlighted, however, that in "a sign of 
potential trouble for the administration, many of those interviewed made it 
clear that their patience was not endless, and that they had become somewhat 
more questioning of the government line in recent weeks." By way of con-
clusion, the story quoted a political scientist: the Bush administration and 
Congress was "being given a great deal of leeway because people are so 
stunned by this confrontation ... they feel that we have to somehow suspend 
our questioning and our critical eye. But that honeymoon ... is not going to 
last."62 
Nature of the Enemy 
Americans knew of terroristic acts before 9/11; however, the destruction of 
the twin towers and the attack on the Pentagon raised the stakes considerably. 
The 9/11 terrorists were different. They were not angry citizens (Oklahoma 
City) and they weren't enemy soldiers (Nazis, Japanese, or North Koreans). 
Because of this, following 9/11 the Bush administration made a consistent 
effort to shape American perceptions of their new enemy. Bush repeatedly 
stressed the meaning of the theme of the nature of the enemy in his speech, 
and the press picked up on this theme. The New York Times, for example, 
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quoted a criminologist: "we know there's an enemy but we're not exactly 
sure who they are, we don't exactly know how to find them, and we don't 
exactly know how to defeat them."63 
However, other news outlets provided definitive assessments. NBC Night-
ly News, with the effect of better defining the nature of the enemy, relayed 
Bush's words, "the suffering of September lith was inflicted on people of 
many faiths and many nations. All of the victims, including Muslims, were 
killed with equal indifference and equal satisfaction by the terrorist leaders." 
The news repott later stressed that the president "warned if bin Laden and al-
Qaeda acquire weapons of mass destruction, they will use them, arguing the 
future of civilization itself is threatened."64 The Saturday Early Show raised 
the issue of terroristic use of nuclear devices, relaying that the president had 
"made it clear ... that bin Laden has made absolutely no attempt to hide the 
fact that he has been trying to acquire such weapons."65 On Face the Nation, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in response to a question, answered: 
"There is no doubt in my mind but that [terrorists] would use chemical, 
biological, radiation ... or nuclear weapons if they have them .... [They] 
don't worry about the loss of life."66 The Washington Post picked up on 
Bush's stress of the nature of the terrorists. It wrote that the president had 
touched "repeatedly" on that "theme" since 9/11: "Bush said that bin Laden 
and ... al Qaeda ... are 'violating the tenets of every religion,' including 
Islam. 'A murderer is not a martyr,' Bush said, 'he is just a murderer. "'67 
Importantly, beyond relaying Bush's themes about the nature ofterrorists, 
some news outlets broadened the application of the term "enemy." Specifi-
cally, the press began to portray the Bush administration itself as antagonis-
tic. One area of press complaint involved the amount of information flowing 
from the government to the public. In patticular, the New York Times re-
ported on the press demand for more information from the Administration. It 
wrote that the United States was having strained relations with its European 
allies due to a '"post Vietnam patriotic syndrome.'" It charged that public 
information was being "co-opted by the government, or at least swept up by 
patriotism."68 According to the Times, this caused a "public relations prob-
lem" with the Europeans, who as a result feel "they have precious little 
information they can trust."69 The Times used an analogy to pass judgment 
and to justify its point of view: because of the situation, Europeans "rely on 
conflicting and equally unverifiable claims from Pentagon briefings and Tali-
ban news conferences, and are increasingly unwilling to believe either side." 
This atticle forcefully criticized the Bush administration for its "tight lid 
on sensitive military news, particularly about special operations." Asse1ted 
was that "veteran communicators" with wartime experience were, "amazed at 
the limited" access to information and to the battlefields. Secretary of De-
fense Donald H. Rumsfeld was described as a hypocrite who "officially" 
endorsed the "Persian Gulf war guidelines for new media coverage of com-
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bat" but then "enforced policies ensuring that journalists have little or no 
access to independent information about military strategies, successes and 
failures."-7° Skipping over the unprecedented news media access granted dur-
ing the first Gulf War, the paper raised the specter of Vietnam: "The desire to 
keep information and expectations at a minimum stems directly from the 
experience of the Vietnam war."? I 
The New York Times editorially predicted that, "much hard fighting re-
mains before the Taliban can be ousted from power nationwide." This same 
editorial down played the major accomplishment the capture of Mazari Sharif 
represented; instead it stressed that with "winter approaching ... it may be 
some time before a victory in Mazar-1-Sharif can be translated into the goals 
the White House has set for Afghanistan, including the capture ofOsama bin 
Laden." 72 According to a different New York Times editorial, Afghanistan 
and Vietnam were synonymous: "Vietnam's ghosts are still here. [They] 
steal away our cet1ainty that the end will be triumphant. [The] current fight 
will be long and frustrating."73 
Thus, eight weeks following 9/11, we begin to see the press reframing the 
theme of the nature of the enemy. There is still the Bush administration's 
frame: (l) The terrorists kill "with equal indifference and equal satisfaction"; 
(2) The terrorists violate "the tenets of every religion, including the one they 
invoke"; (3) The terrorists have "exacting standards of brutality and oppres-
sion"; and (4) The terrorists are the "authors of mass murder." However, 
while the press was sharing the Bush administration's framing of the nature 
of the enemy theme, it was also beginning to reframe that theme. No longer 
limited to terrorists, the enemy list of America was being enlarged to include 
the Bush administration. Editorially, the New York Times wrote that 
American civil "liberties are eroding, and there is not evidence that the rea-
son is anything more profound than fear and frustration." 74 No evidence was 
provided, although the editors continue and state that "Attorney General John 
Ashcroft has been careless with the Constitution when it comes to the treat-
ment of people arrested in the wake of Sept. 11."75 According the Times, 
there is only a "limited need for secrecy while investigating domestic terror-
ism" and detention of suspected terrorists was considered "extreme 
measures." 76 
Introducing a new topic, a hard news article in the New York Times also 
relayed that paper's editorial position concerning the Bush administration's 
position on military tribunals for non-American terrorists: "The Bush admin~ 
istration has moved swiftly in the last few weeks to expand its national 
security authority and law enforcement powers in ways that are intended to 
bypass Congress and the courts, officials and outside analysts say."77 In 
similar vein the Washington Post editorially wrote: "Few predicted that the 
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government would come down so decisively on the anti-liberty side. 
[This is a] potentially irreversible injury at home if Mr. Bush proceeds ... to 
undermine the rule oflaw."78 
By way of summary, the news media framed four distinct themes in its 
coverage of president Bush's speech: (I) the nature of the enemy as murder-
ous terrorists and the administration's assault on civil liberties; (2) the nature 
of the war as both domestic and global, enduring, but questioning whether a 
war or a police action; (3) the war as being similar to either WWII or Viet-
nam; and (4) the American public's patience running out. 
DISCUSSION 
With this important speech, the Bush administration announced to the world 
that the War on Terror was now composed of four semi-distinct, yet inter-
animated themes: good versus evil; civilization versus barbarism; the nature 
of the new enemy; and the nature of the war. Each complements the other; 
each acts to better flesh out the meaning of the larger frame, the War on 
Terror. By the larger frame, we mean that the War on Terror is a complex 
frame composed of the individual themes mentioned above, and each of 
those themes, during this time period, is in the process of being framed in a 
particular way by the Bush administration. However, the understanding of 
news-consuming Americans is directly influenced by the mainstream news 
reports about what the president says. 79 There is, of course, no one-to-one 
correlation between what the mainstream news reports and what the news 
audience believes. We do know from agenda-setting studies, though, that the 
news audience names as important that which the news media focuses upon. 
Framing analysis allows us to ask how the news media invites-consciously 
or not-its audience to talk about and understand issues and events. Looking 
at Bush speak about the War on Terror through the interpretive lens of the 
mainstream news, we see that the framing of the nature of the war and the 
nature of the new enemy themes was being actively contested, not by critics 
of the president, but by the nature of the news reporting itself. 
Not brought into play were the moral dimensions advanced by the presi-
dent; the theme of good/evil rarely made it into press accounts of the presi-
dent's speech or actions. Although the president repeatedly stressed this and 
other morally charged elements, the press chose to focus on other themes: the 
nature ofthe war, the nature of the enemy, analogies between World War II 
and Vietnam, patience, and the international aspect of the War on Terror 
(namely to assert that the administration was acting unilaterally). ln this 
sense, the news media was attempting to introduce new themes, with their 
own frames in place, into the larger frame of the War on Terror. Certainly 
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Table 5.1. Comparison of President and News Media Themes and Frames 
Themes President's Frame Press Frame 
Goodvs. Evil Struggle of good and evil Not mentioned 
Civilization vs. Struggle of civilization vs. Not mentioned 
Barbarism barbarism 
Nature of Enemy Evil, implacable, murderers Deadly, indiscriminant 
Bush administration, acting 
contrary to country's best 
interest 
Nature of War Domestic/global/enduring Domestic/global/ 
War longstanding 
War or police action 
Similarity to Prior Wars Different Kind of War WWII or Vietnam 
Patience Not mentioned Some, but running out 
International Effort Stated Minimally reported 
introducing new considerations into the public consciousness is part of the 
press function. Yet, by not reporting accurately on how the president charac-
terized the War on Terror-morally-the press failed to allow the American 
public the opportunity to accept or reject that claim. Instead of allowing the 
public to think for itself, the press was doing the public's thinking for them. 
Although no one frame within the larger War on Terror frame dominated 
news stories during the two weeks following the president's speech, we do , 
see the development of media opposition to the administration's framing of 
the nature of the war theme. For example, whereas immediately following 
9/11 the press generally relayed the frames advanced both by the Bush ad-
ministration and by political opponents with little oppositional framing, 80 
here we see this neutral reportorial practice breakdown in favor of the devel-
opment of a strong current of news media opposition against the Bush ad-
ministration. In particular, we see within the theme of the nature of the war 
the news media framing a negative point of view about the actions of the 
administration. These news media-generated interpretations pushed beyond 
what was being said by proponents and opponents of the War on Terror; in 
short, the press itself was beginning to assert an oppositional frame to that 
advanced by the Bush administration. 
Several other impmtant items emerged from this study. First, there was a 
strong correlation between the frames of editorials/opinion essays and the 
content of regular news stories. There seems to be increasing evidence 81 
suggesting that the framing of news stories echoes the frames used by both 
editorial and opinion pages. This is not, however, an obvious process. News 
stories are subtle in their support of editorial positions, usually quoting out-
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side sources whose assertions match well the opinions of editors and colum-
nists. For example, the New York Times editorially stated that the administra-
tion "has been careless with the Constitution when it comes to the treatment 
of people arrested in the wake of Sept. 11." Actions by the administration 
were called "extreme measures" and the paper suggested a "limited need for 
secrecy."82 A hard news New York Times article later led with this sentence: 
"The Bush administration has moved swiftly ... to expand its national 
security authority and Jaw enforcement power in ways that are intended to 
bypass Congress and the courts, officials and outside analysts say." 83 An-
other quoted "Civil liberties groups on both sides of the Atlantic" that op-
posed the Bush administration's handling of the new War on Terror. 84 Civil 
liberties groups supporting the administration's efforts remained un-
reported. 85 
Second, we believe the War on Terror frame can best be described as a 
master frame, one that is comprised of numerous themes. Some have defined 
master frames as similar to paradigms in science. 86 Others have said that 
master frames structure "the way in which its adherents process information 
coming from the environment and the manner in which they disseminate 
information to others."87 As a master frame, the War on Terror is composed 
of numerous themes; in turn, each of those themes is framed in a particular 
manner by both the president and the news media. Much research in framing 
suggests a single, pervasive frame that dominates a news story. The case 
study here contraindicates this, in part because the response of the news 
media was examined over a period of time, thereby allowing for a more 
nuanced look at the total response. Although the strength of frames has been 
examined in other studies, the idea of a frame being composed of themes-
each of which is individually framed-has yet to be examined fully. 
Third, this project demonstrates that the press actively contested the fram-
ing of the War on Terror as early as eight weeks following 9/1 1. This finding 
stands apart from communication and other literature suggesting the press 
supported the president or was insufficiently critical of the president's efforts 
after 911 I. These studies often rely primarily on tallying a priori textual units, 
essentially assuming that when the press used phrases or labels which ap-
peared in the administration's statements (most notably, the label "War on 
Terror") this constituted a supportive story context for the administration's 
rationale for its Iraq policy. Counting only finds content; it does not allow for 
nuanced analysis of how that content is framed. In short, the presence of 
themes is often taken as evidence of a particular frame. 
We speculate that some researchers may have mistaken the press's initial 
accurate relaying of presidential themes and theme framing as uncritical 
"echoing" without noticing instances of the press's subsequent construction 
of its own oppositional themes and frames .. For example, a study by Kevin 
Coe, David Domke, Erika S. Graham, Sue Lockett John, and Victor W. 
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Pickard examined fifteen national addresses given by President Bush be-
tween January 200 I to the commencement of the Iraq war, and then exam-
ined editorials published in twenty U.S. newspapers within two days from 
each address. They looked for binary opposites: good/evil and security/peril. 
They suggested that because the editorials contained references to these bi-
naries that were used by the president, that the press "echoed" the words of 
the president, showing him unprecedented support; they-go so far as to report 
that "it seems highly likely that the press, through consistent amplification of 
the president's communications, contributed to the president's remarkable 
successes with Congress between September II and the Iraq War and to the 
Republican Party's 2002 election triumph."88 This study adroitly finds con-
tent; as designed, however, it is unable to analyze how that content was 
framed. In short, the presence of themes was taken as evidence of a particular 
frame. 
Our findings strongly suggest a very different treatment of the Bush ad-
ministration than that suggested by Coe et al. and other such studies. When 
taking into consideration how themes are framed, we found that the news 
media conveyed stories in a way that supported the idea of some kind of 
action against terrorism, while concomitantly opposing the president's initia-
tives. Put another way, the press echoed some of Bush's themes but not his 
frames. As we demonstrate in this chapter, in some cases, the news media 
relayed Bush's broad ideas about the nature of the enemy and the nature of 
the war against terrorism. However, the media did not always neutrally con-
vey the president's point of view. Rather, it inserted its own orientations, 
thereby altering frames offered to audiences. fn other cases, the press failed 
to mention the president's themes and frames (e.g., good versus evil) or 
reported them minimally (e.g., international effort). For that reason it seems 
clear to us that the press by no means provided uncritical support for the 
administration's Iraq policy, but, instead, actively took a critical or even 
oppositional stance shortly after the president 's speech to the United Nations. 
In sum, eight weeks after 9/11 , the news media was moving beyond 
reporting political opposition to the president-a very necessary and valuable 
press function-and was instead actively choosing themes, and framing 
those themes, in such a way that the president's focus was opposed, misrep-
resented, or ignored. As Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell write, "the 
media are not simply intermediaries between political actors and the mass 
pubJic. Journalists can actively limit the public's right to access and evaluate 
different policy platforms and thus diminish the quality of political dialogue. 
Such actions have the potential to inhibit pluralism by blocking out the 
preferred themes of interest groups and politicians. "89 Put more critically, the 
press may sometimes act as a de facto arbiter of contentious issues, rather 
than as a neutral conveyor of crucial information to the public who then 
decides the issues. As mentioned earlier, we believe the essential role of the 
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press is to provide information for Americans to use; in the case of the 
aftermath of Bush's speech to the United Nations, the mainstream news 
media covered in this study collectively failed to neutrally convey presiden-
tial statements to the public. 90 In doing so, they denied tens-of-millions of 
Americans who relied upon them the infonnation they needed to make in-
formed decisions on the policies that would affect their lives. Although it was 
beyond the scope of this work, careful study of the effects of the reportage on 
public opinion of the War on Terror would be of great interest, as well. ln 
short, further empirical work will be helpful in assessing the fidelity of news 
products to the events they convey to the public, across space and time, with 
an eye toward the consequences of press infidelity for the public sphere. 
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